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This paper applies a simple economic framework to the choice between pleading and 
summary judgment as points at which a claim can be dismissed.  It concludes generally that 
pleading standards should vary with the evidentiary demands of the associated legal standards 
and the social costs of litigation.  The common law’s imposition of higher pleading standards for 
fraud claims is consistent with this proposition.  The theory implies that the rigorous summary 
judgment standards that have been developed by antitrust courts should lead to a correspondingly 
rigorous assessment at the pleading stage.   1
When Should a Case Be Dismissed? The Economics of  
Pleading and Summary Judgment Standards 
 




Pleading is the term lawyers apply to the claims plaintiffs assert when they enter 
court, and the specific language used to assert them.  As every law student quickly learns, 
pleading under the common law was a high-stakes game.  Under the common law writ 
system, a legal action began when the plaintiff obtained a writ ordering the defendant to 
appear and defend himself.  A plaintiff could lose if he chose the wrong writ, and each 
writ had its own pleading requirements. 
In the latter half of the 1800s, courts in England and in the United States began to 
reform the pleading process in an effort to simplify the requirements.
1  The reforms 
aimed to make the pleadings serve the functions of providing notice to defendants and 
guidance to courts.  The simplified pleading requirements were designed to make legal 
judgments turn on the underlying merits of the case rather than the skill of lawyers in 
satisfying arcane pleading rules. 
There are opposing views today on the degree to which courts should use 
pleading requirements to police the types of claims allowed to enter courts.  One view 
holds that in order for pleadings to serve the purpose of guiding courts and providing 
notice, courts need to rigorously enforce pleading rules in order to bar claims that fail to 
meet them.  The opposing view argues that the pleading rules should not be used to bar 
many claims because there are other devices that can serve this purpose; such as pretrial 
discovery, pretrial conference, and summary judgment. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the choice between using pleading rules 
and other devices to screen claims.
2  Specifically, I will focus on the choice between the 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Friedenthal, Kane, and Miller (2005), at 252. 
2 For a general discussion of the economics of pleading standards, see Bone (2003), 125-157.  There is a 
related literature on the allocation of burdens of proof, see Hay and Spier (1997).  While this paper 
addresses in a general way the setting of optimal proof burdens, it does not address the allocation of proof 
burdens.   2
pleading stage and summary judgment stage as points at which a claim can be dismissed.
3  
I will apply the results of the analysis to the law on pleading standards, and especially the 
pleading standard for conspiracy claims under the Sherman Act.   
The results suggest a positive theory of the common law on pleading standards 
and a normative theory for the developing antitrust pleading standards.  In general, 
pleading standards should vary with the evidentiary demands of the associated legal 
standards and the social costs of litigation.  This explains why the common law imposed 
higher pleading requirement for certain claims – e.g., claims of fraud, which were 
difficult to prove and imposed substantial social costs beyond litigation expenses.  The 
theory developed here implies that the rigorous summary judgment standards that have 
been developed recently by antitrust courts with respect to predatory pricing, resale price 
maintenance, and conspiracy claims based on parallel conduct should lead to a 
correspondingly rigorous assessment at the pleading stage. 
 
2. Economics of Civil Procedure: Dismissals and Pleading Standards 
 
In order to gain some economic intuition for the role of pleading standards, we 
must first examine the function of dismissals in the litigation process.  In this section I 
briefly set out the standard model of litigation and introduce dismissals into that model. 
 
Standard model of litigation 
The standard model of litigation is a one period model that focuses on the filing 
and settlement decisions.  A suit is filed if the expected judgment exceeds the cost of 
litigation.  If we let Pp equal the plaintiff’s prediction of the likelihood of a verdict in his 
favor, v equal the loss suffered by the plaintiff (and also the amount awarded if the 
plaintiff wins his case), and cp the plaintiff’s cost of litigation, a lawsuit will be filed 
when 
Ppv > cp        ( 1 )  
                                                 
3 Typically, defendants challenge cases at the pleading stage by filing a motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim.  The summary judgment motion typically occurs later in the litigation process and often 
challenges not only the sufficiency of the allegations but also the existence of factual support for the 
allegations.  See Friedenthal, Kane, and Miller, at 465-469.    3
Let Pd equal the defendant’s prediction of the likelihood of a verdict in the plaintiff’s 
favor and cd the defendant’s cost of litigation. 
Settlement, in the standard model, is described by the “Landes-Posner-Gould” 
condition, under which settlement occurs if and only if   
    (Pp – Pd)v < cp + cd        ( 2 )  
 
Introducing dismissals 
The standard model does not incorporate dismissal of lawsuits.  Dismissal should 
occur when the social gain from litigation is less than its cost.  Following Shavell (1982) 
(and Hylton (1990a), at 165-166), the social desirability of litigation can be determined 
by comparing social costs when litigation occurs to social costs when litigation is 
prohibited.  Let θnc equal the probability of an injury when the potential defendant/injurer 
does not take care, θc equal the probability of an injury when the potential defendant does 
take care, x equal the cost of care, h equal the likelihood of a lawsuit, and w equal the 
percentage of potential injurers who take care because of the threat of liability.
4 
The percent of potential injurers who take care, w, is a function of the merit of 
lawsuits.  Meritless lawsuits will target with equal likelihood injurers who took care and 
injurers who did not.  As a result, meritless lawsuits will provide relatively weak 
incentives for potential injurers to take care.  In general, the injurer’s incentive to take 
care depends on the difference between his expected liability when he takes care and 
when he does not.  As this difference increases, the injurer’s incentive to take care 
increases.  Since the difference between the injurer’s expected liability when he takes 
care and when he does not declines as the merit level of lawsuits declines, so does the 
incentive to take care.
5  Assume, then, that w is an increasing function of the merit of the 
average lawsuit.  We can let Pp serve as a proxy for the lawsuit’s merit. 
When lawsuits are prohibited, no one takes care, so total social cost is  
θncv       ( 3 )  
                                                 
4 This model is general enough to apply to intentional harms as well.  For example, in the antitrust setting, x 
could represent the profit forgone by the dominant firm if it forbears from some anticompetitive act. 
5 Obviously, this is an extremely simple version of a more complicated model; see Hylton (1990b), which 
can easily be modified to formalize this intuitive argument.     4
When lawsuits are permitted, the fraction w of potential injurers take care, so social cost 
is 
(1-w) θncv + w(θcv + x) + h(cp + cd)     (4) 
Suit is socially desirable, then, when 
      w[(θnc – θc)v-x] > h(cp + cd)     (5) 
In words, this means that a suit is socially desirable when the “deterrence benefits” 
(injuries avoided net of avoidance costs) exceed the total litigation costs.  An ideal 
system of civil procedure rules would seek to maximize the difference between 
deterrence benefits and litigation costs.  Equivalently, an ideal system would minimize 
the sum of under-deterrence, over-deterrence, and litigation costs.  Yet another way of 
saying the same thing is that an ideal system would minimize the sum of false-acquittal, 
false-conviction, and litigation costs. 
  This implies that there is a critical level of merit below which lawsuits should be 
barred.  Specifically, since w(Pp) is an increasing function, if we allow p P to be the level 
of merit at which the left and right hand sides of (5) are equal, suit should be dismissed 
whenever Pp <  p P .  When a plaintiff files a claim that appears to fall below that critical 
level of merit, the court should dismiss the claim. 
 
Multi-stage litigation and abusive suits 
As Baxter (1980) noted, the standard model fails to capture the multi-stage nature 
of litigation.  Litigation consists of several motions, some of which (e.g., the dismissal 
motion) can put an end to the case, while others alter its direction sharply. 
The first model to show how the multi-stage nature of litigation changes the 
results of the standard one-period approach is that of Bebchuk (1996).  In the Bebchuk 
model, the multi-staged nature of litigation results in the prosecution of suits that appear 
to have a negative expected value. 
The key reason negative-expected-value suits are prosecuted in the Bebchuk 
model is because early-stage litigation expenditures become sunk costs as litigation 
progresses.  Thus, once a plaintiff has reached a late stage of litigation, his incentive to   5
continue depends on the prospect of winning and the prospective (forward looking) cost 
of litigation. 
For example, suppose the cost of litigation to the plaintiff is $100 in each of two 
periods (the total cost to the plaintiff is $200).  The expected value of the judgment to the 
plaintiff is $180 at the start of the first period.  This appears to be a negative expected 
value suit.  However, at the start of the second period, the plaintiff’s profit from 
continuing the litigation is $80.  Given this, the plaintiff has a credible threat of 
maintaining the lawsuit after the first stage.  Suppose, in view of that credible threat, the 
defendant is willing to settle at the start of the second period for $110.  Given this 
settlement amount at the beginning of the second period, the plaintiff’s threat to sue at the 
start of the first period becomes credible. 
One lesson from the Bebchuk model is that the multi-stage nature of litigation can 
generate frivolous or abusive claims.  For the present, I will loosely define an abusive 
claim as one with such a low probability of victory on the merits that the plaintiff’s 
primary purpose for bringing the suit is to take advantage of the possibility of an 
erroneous decision in his favor. 
 
Information and sunk-cost effects in litigation 
In addition to the “sunk-cost” effect identified by the Bebchuk model, multi-stage 
litigation also includes information effects.
6  As the litigants move from one stage to 
another, the information on the plaintiff’s probability of winning changes. 




i, i = 1, 2.  Given that 
first period costs are sunk, at the start of the second period the plaintiff’s claim remains 
credible if Pp
2v > cp






Suppose that settlement amount is S
2.   Following Bebchuk, suit will be filed at 
the beginning of the first period if S
2 > cp
1.  Given that a credible suit will be filed at the 
beginning of the first period, the defendant has an incentive to settle at the same time.  
The settlement incentive for the defendant will increase as the defendant’s first period 
litigation cost increases.  These are straightforward implications of the Bebchuk model. 
                                                 
6 See Bone (2003), at 38.   6
However, there is one difference between the case just explored and the Bebchuk 
model.  In this version, the plaintiff’s probability of victory changes over time.  It is only 
the second stage probability of victory that matters to the plaintiff’s incentives to file.  
Thus, a plaintiff could file a suit with a virtually zero chance of victory based on 
information available at the start of stage 1.  Such a suit would appear to be abusive in the 
sense loosely defined above. 
This suggests a different approach to assessing abusiveness.  Abusiveness should 
be determined based on information available at the start of the second period of 
litigation.  Thus if Pp
2 is below some critical threshold, the suit should be considered 
abusive, even if Pp
1 is above that threshold.  In a setting in which the likelihood of victory 
changes over time, credibility should be determined by the likelihood of victory at the 
final stage. 
In addition, the notion of a positive-expected-value lawsuit should also reflect the 
final period likelihood of victory.  Thus, if we consider the expected likelihood of victory 
at the end of the second period, based on information available at the start of the first, a 




2 .  Credibility, which 
should also be determined by the end-period expectation of victory, may exist even when 
this positive-expected-value condition is not satisfied. 
 
Pleading standards and dismissal: pleading versus summary judgment 
In this part I will focus on dismissal in the multi-stage model.  Assume now that 
the first stage of litigation is the pleading stage, and the beginning of the second stage is 
the summary judgment moment. 
Let us now define an abusive suit as one in which 
Pp
2 < τ  ,       ( 6 )  
where τ is the threshold level of merit below which a suit should not be permitted to 
survive a motion for summary judgment.  The threshold merit level should be based on 
the objective of minimizing social costs (see part II.B of this paper), or, equivalently, on 
the goal of minimizing the sum of false-acquittal, false-conviction, and litigation costs.   
It follows that the threshold merit level should increase as litigation becomes less 
productive as a deterrent and more costly to society.   7
The question examined in this section is the standard a court should apply to the 
pleading stage.  Given the merit threshold necessary at the summary judgment stage, at 
the pleading stage a court should dismiss if 
       E(Pp
2| Pp
1) < τ    .       ( 7 )  
In other words, if, given information available at the pleading stage, the expected merit 
level of the lawsuit at the summary judgment stage is below the threshold at which 
dismissal should occur, the plaintiff’s lawsuit should be dismissed at the pleading stage.  
Pleading stage dismissals are socially desirable under this rule because they enable courts 
to reduce overall social costs without having to further increase the merit threshold.  
To gain useful insights from the pleading stage dismissal criterion, consider a case 
in which there are two merit levels possible at the final (summary judgment) stage.  One 
is the same level of merit at the pleading stage, Pp
1.  This is the pessimistic scenario in 
which the plaintiff finds nothing to enhance the merit of his claim after engaging in 
discovery.  The other merit level is the discovery-enhanced merit level ψ, where ψ > Pp
1.  
Suppose the likelihood of reaching the discovery-enhanced merit level ψ is α.  Since 
E(Pp
2|  Pp
1) =  αψ  +  ( 1  –  α) P p
1, a case should be dismissed at the pleading stage 












α .       ( 8 )  
 
This implies several rules for dismissal at the pleading stage. 
1. Dismissal at the pleading stage should occur only in those cases in which the 
claims and evidence asserted at the pleading stage are insufficient to meet the merit 
requirement at the summary judgment stage (i.e., Pp
1 < τ). 
2. Given that the pleadings are insufficient to meet the summary judgment merit 
requirement (Pp
1 < τ), a claim should be allowed to pass the pleading stage only if the 
discovery-enhanced merit level is unambiguously greater than the summary judgment 
merit requirement (i.e., ψ > τ). 
3. Again, assume the pleadings are insufficient to meet the summary judgment 
merit requirement.  If the discovery-enhanced merit level is barely sufficient to satisfy the 
summary judgment merit threshold, the plaintiff’s pleadings must indicate that it is   8
virtually certain that he will produce that enhanced level of merit in order to be allowed 
past the pleading stage (i.e., where ψ is only slightly greater than τ, α must be close to 
one). 
4. Since the threshold merit level (τ) is increasing in the social cost of the type of 
litigation initiated by the plaintiff, dismissals should occur more often for more costly 
claims.  For example, if the plaintiff’s claim imposes relatively high costs on the 
defendant, say by severely damaging his business or by imposing exorbitant discovery 
costs, the threshold level of merit should be correspondingly high. 
This analysis of pleading-stage dismissal implies a rather stingy approach on the 
part of courts.  In any case in which there is considerable doubt as to whether the plaintiff 
will be able to survive summary judgment, because the potential quantum of evidence in 
support of the plaintiff will at best approximate the minimum needed to survive summary 
judgment, the courts should dismiss at the pleading stage. 
 
Circumstantial and direct evidence 
To further explore the implications of this analysis of pleading-stage dismissal, 
suppose the level of merit at the summary judgment phase is a function of two types of 
evidence, circumstantial and direct.  Circumstantial evidence, as the name implies, is 
evidence that creates a strong inference in favor of the proposition it supports, while 
falling short of direct support.  For example, footprints of the same size as the 
defendant’s provide circumstantial evidence that the defendant was at the scene of an 
accident or a crime.  Direct evidence, on the other hand, is evidence that more or less 
demonstrates the proposition it supports.  For example, a videotape showing the 
defendant at the scene of an accident or a crime provides direct evidence in support of the 
plaintiff’s claim. 
The foregoing analysis implies that the court’s quickness to dismiss at the 
pleading stage, for any given summary judgment dismissal standard, should vary with the 
relative probabilities of direct and circumstantial evidence entering the case.  If the 
probability of obtaining direct evidence is high, a court should be more willing to allow 
the claim to proceed beyond the pleading stage.  For example, suppose the plaintiff is 
likely to obtain through discovery a document or eyewitness testimony that conclusively   9
links the defendant to an accident or a crime.  This analysis suggests the court should be 
relatively lenient in allowing such claims to pass the pleading stage. 
On the other hand, if the likelihood of direct evidence is low, and the level of 
merit likely to result from circumstantial evidence is just below the level needed to meet 
the summary judgment threshold, the court should dismiss at the pleading stage.  Under 
these assumptions, the foregoing pleading-stage dismissal analysis implies that the 
plaintiff should be almost certain to meet the circumstantial evidence requirement at the 
summary judgment stage in order to avoid dismissal at the pleading stage.  However, if 
the plaintiff were almost certain to avoid dismissal at the summary judgment stage, he 
should be able to indicate that level of merit at the pleading stage.  Given this, a claim 
that fails to demonstrate that level of merit at the pleading stage should be dismissed. 
 
3. Application to Pleading Law 
 
This analysis suggests that there should be a close relationship between the 
summary judgment dismissal standard and the pleading stage dismissal standard.  The 
summary judgment dismissal standard is a function of the legal standard for liability and 
the facts offered to support the plaintiff’s claim that the legal standard will be satisfied.  
This has immediate implications for existing views on the proper standard for dismissal 
at the pleading stage. 
 
Liberal versus conservative views of pleading requirements 
On one hand there are liberal views, such as the “aggregate of operative facts” 
and “primary right” theories.
7  Under the operative-facts theory, proponents assert that 
plaintiffs should be able to pass the pleading stage if they have asserted all of the facts 
that might lead to a valid claim for liability, even if they have not linked those facts to 
specific legal theories.  This view appears to be too liberal under this paper’s analysis 
because if the facts asserted fail to allow one to predict what will happen at the summary 
judgment stage, then the claim should be dismissed at the pleading stage. 
                                                 
7 Friedenthal, Kane, and Miller, at 259-260.   10
The other liberal approach to pleading focuses on the primary right of the 
plaintiff: for example, whether there has been a violation of the plaintiff’s right to 
exclusive use of his property.  This approach also appears to be too liberal.  Asserting the 
violation of a primary right at the pleading stage may not be enough to allow a court to 
predict the outcome of a summary judgment motion. 
The conservative position is the “theory of the pleadings” doctrine, which requires 
the plaintiff to tailor his assertions at the pleading stage to satisfy a specific legal theory.
8  
This is closer to the approach suggested by this paper.  Of course, it might be too 
conservative, if applied in a manner that does not take into account the possibility that 
there could be more than one legal theory. 
The proper standard suggested by this paper requires an assessment of the 
pleading stage in light of what will be required at the summary judgment stage.  This 
suggests that pleading stage requirements should vary with the demands of summary 
judgment stage requirements.  Certainly, specific legal theories will be required at the 
summary judgment stage, as well as facts to support those legal theories.  Where the 
summary judgment standard is relatively high, in terms of the factual support required, 
the pleading stage requirements should be relatively high.  Conversely, where the 
summary judgment stage requirements are relatively low, the courts should be liberal at 
the pleading stage. 
This does not, at least in theory, lead to the “man-traps” that Bentham once 
complained had riddled the common law,
9 causing plaintiffs to lose valid claims because 
they had failed to assert some special combination of words at the pleading stage.  The 
theory implied here suggests that an objective observer, presumably the court, should 
attempt to forecast the legal theories and summary judgment standards associated with 
those theories.  This approach would not penalize a plaintiff for failing to assert a claim 
that was clearly implied by the facts set out in the pleadings. 
 
Understanding the law on pleading 
                                                 
8 Id. at 261. 
9 Bentham (1928), at 163-164.   11
We can understand the law on pleading standards in light of the foregoing 
analysis.  And by “the law”, I refer to the way courts have dealt with pleadings more than 
the particular rules set out in the civil procedure codes.  The procedural codes reflect 
broad judgments about the desirability of litigation that may not be reflected in some of 
the narrow, case-specific decisions on pleading. 
Discrimination claims appear to have relatively light pleading requirements.
10  
This is consistent with the theory of this paper because the summary judgment stage 
requirements are relatively low.  At the summary judgment stage, a discrimination 
plaintiff will either have direct evidence or circumstantial evidence of discrimination. 
If the plaintiff has direct evidence of discrimination, such as a memo in which an 
employer asserts a plan to discriminate against a certain class of employees, he will most 
likely win his case and clearly have enough to survive a summary judgment motion.  
Some courts have defended the relatively low pleading threshold in discrimination cases 
on the basis of this possibility, but that is unpersuasive.  Direct evidence is unlikely to 
appear, and the prospect of discovering it would provide a basis for allowing every claim 
to continue beyond the pleading stage. 
The more likely scenario is the case in which the plaintiff will have only 
circumstantial evidence at the summary judgment stage.  However, the circumstantial 
evidence required in discrimination cases is not particularly difficult to amass and 
relatively easy to interpret.  For example, if the plaintiff can show that similar employees 
not within the same protected class were treated differently (better) by the employer, that 
may be sufficient to survive a summary judgment motion. 
However, the discrimination claim is a relatively new species within the 
population of legal claims.  The best evidence to support the theory of this paper is likely 
to be found in the common law treatment of pleading requirements.  Two cases in which 
the common law imposed special pleading requirements are fraud and defamation. 
In the case of fraud, the common law required pleading of specific facts detailing 
the fraudulent act.  One justification typically provided is that fraud amounts to an 
allegation of immorality.  The other traditional justification is that an allegation of fraud 
could serve as the basis for avoiding contracts, deeds, and similar documents.  For 
                                                 
10 See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506 (2002)   12
example, a contracting party might refuse to pay after a delivery of widgets.  When the 
widget supplier sues for payment, the purchaser could assert a claim of fraud against the 
supplier.  Given the potential damage to commerce if claims of this sort dragged on in 
court without any serious effort to weed frivolous from valid charges, the specificity 
requirement developed in the common law governing fraud actions seems desirable. 
In terms of this paper’s theory, the specificity requirement adopted under the 
common law for fraud actions is an example of courts raising the merit threshold in 
order: (1) to ensure that a claim admitted into court was likely to meet the evidentiary 
requirements of the legal standard and (2) to reduce the frequency of socially wasteful 
litigation.  As legal hornbooks note, the law imposed high evidentiary burdens on 
plaintiffs in fraud actions, requiring them to prove misrepresentation of fact, knowledge 
of falsity, intent to deceive, reliance, and substantial injury.
11  Where the legal standard 
imposes a heavy burden on plaintiffs, the pleading standard should impose a relatively 
high burden. 
In addition to the difficulty of meeting the legal standard, the social cost of fraud 
litigation provides another reason under this paper’s theory for imposing a heightened 
pleading standard.  There are several costs clearly connected to fraud claims.  One is the 
cost of litigation, which is associated with any legal claim.  Another is the reputation cost 
imposed on the defendant.  In markets in which reputation matters greatly, an allegation 
of fraud could severely damage a business.  And another cost is the disruption in 
commerce.  If courts refused to screen out frivolous claims of fraud, businesses would 
find it more difficult to enforce valid contracts, forcing them to rely on alternatives such 
as long-term relationships or demanding property to be held as security. 
The common law also required specificity in pleading for defamation actions.  
This is also consistent with this paper’s analysis.  Here, the problem is not the burden 
imposed on the class of potential defendants.  In the case of defamation claims, as 
Holmes noted long ago,
12 society has an interest in making sure that they do not 
discourage speech.  Defamation claims have had to meet relatively high proof standards.  
                                                 
11 See, e.g., Calamari and Perillo (1977), 278-292. 
12 Holmes (1881), 138-140.   13
The rigorous pleading standard is a reflection of the relatively high proof standard and the 
perceived social cost of cheap defamation litigation. 
 
Pleading in antitrust 
Like discrimination claims, antitrust is also a relatively new area of litigation.  
Because of its relatively recent birth, one cannot examine the common law treatment of 
pleading in antitrust claims in order to test whether the theory set out earlier in this paper 
provides a justificatory account of long-settled law.  Moreover, the dismissal standards at 
summary judgment and pleading stages are still in the process of development in 
antitrust.
13 
Recognizing the social costs of false convictions, antitrust courts have raised the 
evidentiary requirements to survive a summary judgment motion with respect to many 
claims.  Brooke Group establishes a recoupment test for predatory pricing claims that 
plaintiffs find extremely difficult to satisfy at the summary judgment stage.
14  The courts 
have recognized the high costs of permitting erroneous claims of predation to work their 
way all the way to a jury.  The resale-price-maintenance cases have established high 
proof standards for claims that reach the summary judgment stage.
15  Here the law 
reflects the increasing recognition that resale price maintenance is not, as a general 
matter, socially harmful, and is in many instances socially beneficial.  The conspiracy 
case law has imposed a “plus factors” requirement at the summary judgment stage that 
requires plaintiffs to provide evidence suggesting that the defendants’ conduct could not 
be explained by independently-motivated action.
16 
In many of these areas of antitrust litigation, courts have not worked out precisely 
what should be required at the pleading stage.  In other words, summary judgment tests 
have imposed increasingly high burdens on plaintiffs in antitrust, while pleading 
                                                 
13 For a recent independent analysis of antitrust dismissal standards that reaches conclusions similar to 
those in this part, see Epstein (2006).  On the general point that antitrust dismissal standards sometimes 
reflect general perceptions of the social costs of litigation, see Calkins (1988). 
14 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993). 
15 Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984).  
16 See, e.g., Gellhorn, Kovacic, and Calkins (2004), at 277-282.  For an alternative to the “plus factors” 
view, see Judge Posner’s opinion in In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litigation, 295 F.3d 651 (7th 
Cir. 2002).  Citing his view that Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits tacit collusion, Judge Posner would 
permit courts to follow a totality-of-the-circumstances approach to assessing circumstantial evidence at the 
summary judgment stage.   14
standards have remained unclear in many jurisdictions.  This opens the possibility of high 
merit thresholds required at the summary judgment stage coupled with low merit 
thresholds at the pleading stage. 
A current example of this legal uncertainty is Twombly v. Bell Atlantic.
17  The 
plaintiffs assert that the incumbent “baby-bell” telephone monopolies, also known as 
Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (ILECs), conspired to: (1) prevent competitive local 
exchange carriers (CLECs) from entering into their markets and competing against them, 
as encouraged by access requirements of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, and (2) 
avoid entering each other’s markets in order to compete. 
The district court examined the plaintiff’s complaint for evidence that it was 
likely to satisfy the summary judgment standard, which requires the provision of 
evidence of plus factors (evidence that the alleged conspirators were acting against 
individual self-interest).  The district court found that all of the evidence asserted by the 
plaintiff’s complaint was entirely consistent with individually-motivated profit-seeking 
conduct.  The district court dismissed the complaint at the pleading stage. 
The Second Circuit reversed on the ground that the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure do not impose heightened pleading standards for antitrust claims.  The court 
noted that heightened standards exist for fraud, mistake, and defamation claims; and 
asserted that outside of those narrow categories all that is required is that the complaint 
be sufficient to give notice of the claims the plaintiff intends to prove in court. 
This paper’s theory would require the plaintiff to satisfy the standard adopted by 
the district court.  There are several reasons.  First, the merit threshold has already been 
set high at the summary judgment stage in order to reduce the frequency and costs of 
false convictions.  Failing to adjust the pleading standard is inconsistent with this policy.  
Maintaining a low merit standard at the pleading stage undermines the restrictive policy 
embodied in the high summary judgment standard by encouraging the very lawsuits that 
the high summary judgment standard aimed to discourage. 
Second, a low pleading standard permits the plaintiff to impose discovery costs on 
the defendants, which are generally understood to be a heavy burden in antitrust cases.  
The discovery costs are large enough to encourage defendants to settle claims even when 
                                                 
17 425 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2005).   15
the plaintiff’s claim is highly likely to fail.  In the case of large class action for treble 
damages, high discovery costs coupled with only a one percent chance of victory at trial 
could force defendants to pay substantial settlements.  
What, precisely, are the false-conviction costs associated with conspiracy claims 
based on circumstantial evidence?  Suppose firms in an oligopolistic industry are not 
colluding, but they have reduced prices in parallel fashion (i.e., roughly simultaneous and 
similar conduct).  A low proof standard for pleading encourages plaintiffs to file suit 
whenever a case, however weak, can be made that harmful price-fixing may have 
occurred.  Realizing this, the potential defendant would be well advised to avoid 
increasing price in a parallel fashion, since that would generate price-fixing claims.  But 
if firms are aware that lawsuits will follow parallel price increases, then they will also 
know that it is risky to engage in price competition, since upward price movements, 
which inevitably must occur if price competition is really vigorous, will be followed by 
lawsuits.  The result is that the litigation threat discourages the vigorous competition that 
the law aims to encourage. 
The third reason the conspiracy plaintiffs in Twombly should be required at the 
pleading stage to present evidence that indicates that they will be able to satisfy the 
summary judgment standard is that the best that they can hope for is to satisfy the 
summary judgment standard.  And given this, the plaintiffs should be required to show 
that they are highly likely to satisfy that standard.  The likelihood of finding direct 
evidence of a conspiracy is low, and would require combing through warehouses full of 
internal documents.  There is no obvious upside to the proof that the plaintiffs might 
bring in these cases, which distinguishes them from most employment discrimination 
cases.  In parallel-action conspiracy cases the standard types of circumstantial evidence 
are insufficient to meet the summary judgment standard, while the standard types of 
circumstantial evidence are sufficient in discrimination cases.  Parallel-action conspiracy 
claims therefore depend heavily on the hope of finding direct evidence, which is highly 
unlikely. 
The pleading standard demanded by the district court recognizes what common 
law courts have recognized for many years; that pleading standards should be adjusted to 
take into account the requirements of the legal standard and the social costs of litigation.    16
Pleading standards for fraud were set relatively high under the common law for these 




This paper applies a simple economic framework to the choice between pleading 
and summary judgment as points at which a claim can be dismissed.  It concludes 
generally that pleading standards should vary with the evidentiary demands of the 
associated legal standards and the social costs of litigation.  The common law’s 
imposition of higher pleading standards for fraud claims is consistent with this 
proposition.  It also implies that the rigorous summary judgment standards developed in 
antitrust courts with respect to claims of predation, resale price maintenance, and 
conspiracy should be paired with rigorous pleading requirements.   17
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